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ABSTRACT
Kumavat, Apeksha Dipak M.S.E.C.E., Purdue University, December 2016. Video
Annotation By Crowd Workers With Privacy-preserving Local Disclosure . Major
Professor: Alexander J. Quinn.
Advancements in computer vision are still not reliable enough for detecting video
content including humans and their actions. Microtask crowdsourcing on task mar-
kets such as Amazon Mechnical Turk and Upwork can bring humans into the loop.
However, engaging crowd workers to annotate non-public video footage risks revealing
the identities of people in the video who may have a right to anonymity.
This thesis demonstrates how we can engage untrusted crowd workers to detect be-
haviors and objects, while robustly concealing the identities of all faces. We developed
a web-based system that presents obfuscated videos to crowd workers, and provides
them with a mechanism to test their hypotheses about what behaviors and/or objects
might be present in the videos.
Our system, called Fovea, works by initially applying a heavy median blur to the
videos. This guarantees privacy but impedes recognition of other content of interest.
An algorithm was developed as a part of this thesis to calculate the radius of a
safe-to-reveal region around a pixel. It was implemented into an interactive system
that allows workers watching the blurred videos to selectively reveal small regions by
clicking.
We compared two approaches for local disclosure of information—foveated mode
and keyhole mode—together with a non-interactive blur-only mode as a control. The
results showed that both modes led to superior recognition of actions while keeping
the odds of correct face recognition close to that of the control.
11. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Vision
This thesis is motivated by our vision of a privacy-preserving crowdsourced video
annotation system, called Fovea. In this section, we present envisioned interactions
with our system.
Officer Dan, after his usual patrolling of the neighborhood while wearing the
body-worn camera, returns to the department at the end of the day and handovers
his camera to Officer Sarah, who is in-charge of uploading the departments body-worn
camera footage on public platforms. After getting the videos from all the cameras
handed over to her at the end of the day, each of which contain over 12 hours of video,
she first feeds these videos to Fovea.
At the same-time, in a different part of the world, John turns on the surveillance
camera system installed around his house and feeds the output stream of videos to
Fovea. And so does Sheela, who needs to perform video coding of a large number of
videos, for her juvenile interrogation study. She loads all these videos into Fovea.
Fovea takes the input videos provided to it and without altering the original video
frames, blurs them [at the server] while presenting them to [the client browser as
seen by] the crowd-workers [in form of small video clips or video streams]. Fovea
ensures through controlled blurring that the crowd-workers cannot identify any of
the faces present in the video, however, are able to make an initial hypothesis about
the contents of the video and the location of faces, if any.
After forming the initial hypothesis about a particular region in the video, they
then click on that region to reveal a restricted subset of it, however, such that a face is
never shown to them. They use the information available to them to provide location
2of faces, describe contents of the video and to flag a time instance in the video to be
containing suspicious behavior.
The location of faces obtained from the crowd, are then used by Fovea to redact
all the faces from the original videos. Officer Sarah can now upload these redacted
output videos to any public platform without violating privacy issues. Sheela gets
the content description for all the videos, obtained from the crowd in a short amount
of time, without disclosing the identities of the juvenile subjects of her study. And,
John gets an alert from Fovea about an intruder nearing his property in suspicious
manner, without revealing the identities of his family on an untrusted crowdsourcing
platform.
1.2 Motivation
Searching large collections of video for events or behavior is labor intensive. [Tra-
ditionally, these tasks have been carried out sequentially by a single human.] This
draws us towards utilizing the lucrative solution of splitting and delegating such tasks
on the fast, scalable and flexible crowdsourcing platforms. However, most applica-
tions of video analysis expect privacy protection of subjects present in these videos,
and yet crowdsourcing is normally presumed to be limited to tasks that do not in-
volve private data. This is because crowdsourcing, by definition, involves an “open
call” so there are little controls over who participates. Bypassing normal employment
relationships allows crowdsourcing to deliver rapid response from many workers on
very short notice. However, without an ongoing relationship and the vetting process
that normally precedes it, the incentives to keep an employer’s data confidential are
weaker.
The inability to safely engage crowd workers to perform tasks with sensitive infor-
mation prevents people from freely delegating information work to an always-available
workforce. If not for the issues of privacy and information security, any of the tasks
described for the Fovea system (section 1.1) could be delegated directly to crowd
3workers without any need for pre-processing. Besides task markets, such as Mechan-
ical Turk [1] and Upwork [2], this inhibits the potential of any opportunity to engage
untrusted human help, such as employees from other divisions, or would-be volunteers
from the public.
Ideally, machine automation would make it possible to input video files and find
every occurrence of some target event, such as a fight, theft, or a person holding
a knife. However, despite significant progress in image understanding algorithms,
we are still a long way from general, unconstrained image understanding that rivals
the accuracy of human perception. Automated behavior classification is far more
challenging yet [3–6].
For searching or coding non-public unconstrained video data, such as surveillance
footage or police body camera video (which may sometimes be taken inside private
homes), automated detection is not always reliable enough, and yet current models
of crowdsourcing would present unacceptable risks to privacy. The increased use
of police body cameras in the US—paired with demands for public disclosure and
transparency—have brought particular urgency to this issue and led municipalities,
such as Seattle to search for technical solutions to the problem [7].
1.3 Contribution
This thesis presents a system that allows delegating video analysis tasks to un-
trusted crowd-workers, while preserving privacy, on task markets. As shown in figure
1.1, videos from surveillance cameras or police body-worn cameras are quantized (sub-
system 1), so as to account for the work done by the crowd-workers. The videos are
then provided as input to sub-system 2. This system is responsible for presenting
obfuscated videos to the workers, such that, the workers are able to “detect” the con-
tents of the videos and location of faces, however, are not able to “identify” any face.
This system outputs all the judgements provided by the workers. These judgements
4Fig. 1.1. Designed System
5are then used for extracting information (sub-system 3) about the exact location of
faces and video content.
The system, as seen from figure 1.1, receives input as stored videos from body-
cameras or surveillance camera footages.
To preserve the privacy of the videos, they are initially obfuscated before showing
them to the crowd. The level of obfuscation is set such that it is atleast above
the necessary amount to de-identify all the faces in the given video, as well as, just
sufficient enough for de-identification of only faces, retaining as much of the other
information as possible.
The tradeoff between privacy of identities vs. accuracy of activity recognition
have been studied previously for obfuscation techniques like pixelation and blurring
[8, 9]. [9] implemented a system that allowed researchers to obtain a trade-off curve
in terms of precision and recall over filter level for different obfuscation techniques
(such as level of blurring, or mask padding), by providing a set of example videos
containing the event to be annotated in a test dataset.
However, these techniques use fixed level of global obfuscation, which results in
compromising either the privacy or the accuracy. In our work, at the initial stage,
we use an obfuscation level that is biased towards privacy more than accuracy. The
prior research and our approach for using obfuscation to preserve privacy is covered
in detail in sections 2.3 and 3.1.1.
As a fixed level of global obfuscation, requires compromising either privacy or
accuracy, we provide the crowd-workers with a tool to reveal a region on a video
frame, which they think would help them to form an accurate judgement about the
content of the video. This tool is not intended to form a judgement on its on, however,
to confirm a weak hypothesis that is already formed by watching the obfuscated video.
6Fig. 1.2. Handcrafted illustration of controlled local disclosure (refer Fig-
ure 3.7 for actual results). The disclosure is less for face (in red) and
more for non-face objects (in green). Original picture from Wikimedia
Commons (in public domain) [10].
This tool is designed to allow the crowd worker to click anywhere on a video
frame, and removes the obfuscation in a circular region around this click, such that
no face is ever de-identified in this circular region. Our work focused majorly on the
development of the algorithm for realizing this tool. The system derives its name—
Fovea—due to the integration of this tool which tries to create a foveated image for
allowing the crowd-workers to focus on regions of interest without ever being exposed
to private information.
Finally, in our evaluations, we compare judgements from crowd-workers to con-
firm the increase in accuracy of activity recognition using the controlled information
disclosure tool over using only blurring for privacy protection.
72. BACKGROUND
2.1 Face Recognition in Wild using Machines
Table 2.1.
Data from [11]. True positive rate for various face detection algorithms
against increasing number of allowed false positives
Method No. of fasle No. of fasle No. of fasle
positives ≈ 10 positives ≈ 100 positives ≈ 1000







Zhu et al. 63.8 73.3 76.6
Shen et al. 8 67.5 78.6
Li and Zhang 69.4 80.6 83.7
Li et al. 10 73.3 80.9
Li et al. 69.2 80.8 84.8
Yan et al. 75.9 81.3 85.2
Chen et al. 78.8 83.9 86.2
Mathias et al. 72.5 83.4 87
Yang et al. 75.4 81.6 85.2
Yan et al. - ∼80 ∼84.6
Jun et al. ∼67 ∼77 ∼80.6
8Looking at the extensive development in the field of Pattern Recognition and
Computer Vision, a question that arises is “Why should we use the pattern recog-
nition abilities of humans and not machines?” An obvious solution to this problem
of selective redaction is to use pattern recognition algorithms that allow detection
of sensitive information such as faces, vehicle numbers, etc. and obscure it. Recent
works on visual privacy protection such as SmartRedaction by Utility Inc., are in-
deed directed towards image redaction using computer vision techniques to determine
region-of-interest (ROI) in the picture, for instance, tracking moving people, detecting
faces in live camera videos as well as skin detection. This ROI may then be removed
from the image using the preferred obfuscation technique.
A recent “survey on face detection in the wild: past, present and future” [11],
describes, and compares the performance of the state-of-the-art in face detection. The
survey report is summarized in table 2.1. One of the conclusions of this survey says
“even when allowing a relative large number of false positives (around 1000), there
are still around 15 - 20% of faces that are not detected.” This is a huge false negative
rate when the application demands guaranteed face detection.
Another highly popular technique for detecting a face involves skin color detection
[12–14]. Skin color based face detectors have gained high popularity as they are highly
robust to geometric variations such as scale, rotation as well as pose. The survey of
skin-color modeling and detection methods [15], shows that the Bayesian network
described in [16] shows best performance with 99.4% true positives (and 10% false
negatives). However, these techniques are based on skin-color modelling, that looks
for “skin” in the modelled color spaces. This color-specific detection of skin fails when
the skin color itself is absent in the test image. Figure 2.1 shows examples of human
images where the skin-color based detection fails. However, as can be seen, these
faces are still recognizable enough for human eye.
9Fig. 2.1. Examples of Human Images Where Skin-color Based Detection
Fails. Original images: top-right from wikimedia (public domain) [17],
top-left [18], bottom-left [19] and bottom-right [20] from flickr licensed
under CC BY 2.0
2.2 Content Recognition by Humans
The task of detecting the presence of people and their actions in videos or still
images is currently more efficiently accomplished by humans than machines. The
study [21] shows that humans are not only able to detect, but also recognize famous
celebrities in low-resolution images. Also, humans are able to recognize activities
happening even in a blurred video [22].
Humans use not just individual features but configurational information to build
their understanding of an image [21]. They are able to locate faces using information
such as other body parts, orientation of the body, gait of the person (in the case
10
Fig. 2.2. Significantly degraded celebrity face images that can still be
detected as well as recognized by humans. Image reprinted from [21].
of videos), etc., to make a hypothesis about the presence of a face. The field of
Psychology has extensive work on the way human visual system works. Humans
perceive objects, scenes and faces following the Gestalt laws. Utilization of this fact
for image segmentation and object detection has been shown to perform better than
using just the components of any image [23]. A popular example that shows the bias
of human vision towards configural superiority is shown in figure 2.3.
Fig. 2.3. Importance of configural features, symmetry and enclosure in
human perception. Adding the data from (b) to (a) decreases the time
required to find ’)’ in the image, instead of increasing it due to increased
data. Image reprinted from [23].
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The study [22] shows that humans are able to recognize activities in a video,
even if some information is distorted. These capabilities of humans can be used for
annotating blurred videos, while preserving privacy of the subjects in the video.
2.3 Obfuscation using Image Processing
Fig. 2.4. Examples of the filters - gaussian blur, median blur and pixela-
tion for six different radius levels. Original Frame obtained from videoclip
“Double Indemnity - 02560.avi” in the Hollywood2 dataset [24]
The strategy we use to avoid exposure of the crowd-workers to private information
content is to initially obfuscate the video entirely. The most popular techniques for
obfuscation to preserve privacy are blurring and pixelating. The work [8] compares
the use of these techniques for preserving privacy.
12
However, these techniques have shown limitations in securely redacting the images.
The extensive work on preserving privacy [25] shows that if the obfuscation—blur or
pixelation—used for protecting privacy is mimicked on an available face database, an
automatic face recognition works even after obfuscation, and in case of pixelation,
even better. The work [26] concludes that there is no general blur level that can be
applied to an image that can completely preserve privacy and yet keep the image
utilizable. The work [27] provides a promising technique for preserving privacy while
maintaining the usability of images by averaging the features of a given face with other
faces in the database, creating a new un-identifiable face. However, the technique
Fig. 2.5. Examples of Human Images as shown in Figure 2.1 Obfuscated
Using Median Filter. Original images: top-right from wikimedia (public
domain) [17]; top-left [18], bottom-left [19] and bottom-right [20] from
flickr licensed under CC BY 2.0. Modification: Blurring using median
filter.
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works only when the exact location of face is already known. It cannot be applied on
a global level.
In our work, we have used median blurring instead of the more popular gaussian
blur. Median filtering is widely used for removing noise from an image. However,
as the radius of median filter is increased, segmentation of an image starts occurring
while the image loses the finer details. This type of filtering allows preserving im-
portant configurational information of the image such as spatial location, temporal
behaviour, general geometry and object groups.
The human images shown in Figure 2.1 are presented again in Figure 2.2 after
applying a median filter to these images. As can be seen from Figure 2.2, the locations
of human faces are still discernible, whereas the identities have been redacted to a
huge extent.
However, as was also discussed in section 1.3, implementing fixed level of global
obfuscation to completely redact sensitive information, impedes the ability of a worker
to see the necessary information. Hence, to provide the crowd-workers with the re-
quired information to build a hypothesis about the contents of the video, we allow
the crowd-workers to click anywhere on the video and reveal a small window of infor-
mation that can be used to understand the substance of the video. This technique of
revealing small portion of the ROI is inspired from the online game called “Bubbles”
by Jia Deng, created for their research “Fine-Grained Crowdsourcing for Fine-Grained
Recognition” [28].
2.4 Crowdsourcing Annotation for Privacy-sensitive Videos
A recent study related to privacy vs. accuracy trade-offs for crowdsourcing anno-
tation of behavioral videos [22], demonstrates the use of blurring for ensuring privacy
while compromising accuracy of annotations. Presenting privacy-sensitive videos on
task markets, makes them vulnerable to malicious attacks from crowd for identity
disclosure. There have been previous studies for understanding behavior of crowd
14
and assigning work based on a worker’s reputation [29, 30]. It has been shown that
crowdsourced tasks are not only vulnerable to an untrusted worker but can be hacked
by an entire malicious crowd [31].
Hence, it becomes extremely important for ensuring that the system is immune
to the malicious attacks from the crowd. Section 3.1.3 explains the measures taken
to resist attacks from an entire crowd for disclosing an identity.
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3. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The system that we have developed, provides an interface for the crowd-workers to
analyze video contents without getting exposed to the private information content of
the video. The system encapsulates three major processes:
3.1 Obfuscation
Obfuscated video clips are presented to the crowd-workers, as shown in Figure
3.2, which they can pause, play forward or reverse. The purpose of obfuscation is to
reveal an initial estimation of the video contents. For this, we use the median filtering
technique. This technique is generally used to remove noise in Image Processing, as it
re-assigns every pixel the median of its neighbours in a given radius. This decreases
the number of outliers in a region, sharpening the image.
Fig. 3.1. Process of Median filtering. (a) Original image (b) Median Blur
(radius 3) applied to original image in OpenCV
However, when this filtering is applied with larger radius, it allows segmentation
of the image with less profound boundaries. This converts the image into blob-like
structures, that assist in releasing an initial estimation of the video content, however,
restricting the finer details of it.
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We chose to use the median blur instead of a gaussian blur for obfuscation. As
would be describe in the next section (section 3.2), we allow the crowd-workers to
request revealing small regions of the original image. If a convolution-type filtering
is used and even if a small part of original information is revealed, it would allow a
malicious crowd-worker to approximate the original function used for filtering. Using
this, the worker may be able to reverse the filtering effect to an extent that might make
the faces present in the videos recognizable. In case of median filtering, though it
maintains the structural properties of an image, the original information is completely
lost. This makes it immune to deconvolution attacks using parts of original image.
Fig. 3.2. Above: Original Frame obtained from videoclip “Double Indem-
nity - 02560.avi” in the Hollywood2 dataset [24]; Below: Median Blur
(radius 23) applied to original frame using OpenCV.
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For our system, we apply to all the video frames a median filter of radius 23
using OpenCV function “medianBlur()”. This radius was empirically observed to be
enough to deidentify the faces present in the video frames of the dataset.
3.2 Controlled Local Disclosure
Once the workers have made their initial judgment about the video contents, the
system allows the crowd-workers to pause the video and reveal a particular region
by clicking on it. The heart of our system lies in the algorithm that determines the
radius of the area that gets exposed after these clicks from the workers.
First of all, we present the method for calculating the radius of the information
revealed. We start by removing the noise from the video frame under analysis by
performing median filtering of radius 3. We then convert it into a binary image
using Canny Edge Detection algorithm [32] with lower threshold set to 50 and upper
threshold set to 100.
To calculate the radius of the region that can be safely shown, we find a set of
nearest edges for the pixel under consideration by finding the nearest edge in all the
directions. We then find a set of four points belonging to the nearest edges set of
this pixel, such that these points are separated by 90 degrees angle with reference to
this pixel. Using these four points, an estimate of the ratio of the width and length
of the overall contour is obtained. This ratio is compared with the general human
face width-to-height ratio (FWHR) [33] with an approximation of 20%. If a pixel is
found to be a part of such a contour, a restricted region is revealed to the user. The
general rule of thumb used by artists to sketch human faces suggests that various
features of a face are one-fifth of the face width. Hence, we restrict the radius of the
region revealed to one-tenth (i.e. diameter is one-fifth) of the approximated width
of the contour, which would prevent showing more than one feature of a face. The
pseudocode for the algorithm is shown below (Algorithm 1).
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Algorithm 1 Calculate Safe-To-Reveal Radius
1: procedure CalculateRadius(binaryImage, clickX, clickY)





7: p1← firstEdge(binaryImage,clickX,clickY, θ)
8: p2← firstEdge(binaryImage,clickX,clickY, θ+90)
9: p3← firstEdge(binaryImage,clickX,clickY, θ+180)
10: p4← firstEdge(binaryImage,clickX,clickY, θ+270)
11: if p1 6= NULL and p2 6= NULL and p3 6= NULL and p4 6= NULL then
12: templateMatch← true
13: templateMatchCount← templateMatchCount + 1
14: sumWidths← sumWidths + distance between p1 and p3
15: sumHeights← sumHeights + distance between p2 and p4
16: if templateMatch == true then
17: width← sumWidths/templateMatchCount
18: height← sumHeights/templateMatchCount
19: if height < width then Swap(width, height)
20: if 0.8*(5/6) ≤ width/height ≤ 1.2*(5/6) then
21: radius← width/10
22: else radius← width/2
23: else radius← distance of (clickX,clickY) to nearest edge
24: return radius
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This radius is extremely conservative and restricts the revealed region even for
general objects including lamps, muffins, etc. However, it shows larger areas where
the width-to-height ratio cannot be approximated to the face width-to-height ratio.
This allows obvious patterns like stripes and elongated ellipses be revealed to the
worker. The output of this algorithm for 100 random clicks on the video frame shown
in figure 3.2, for 2 independent iterations is shown figure 3.3.
Fig. 3.3. Two independent iterations for calculating safe-to-reveal radius
for the video frame shown in figure 3.2, each with 100 random simulated
clicks.
Once we know the radius of the region that is safe to be revealed, we consider two
different approaches for revealing this area—keyhole mode and foveated mode. In
this paper, we compare these two different interaction techniques which differ in the
way the information is disclosed using the safe-to-reveal radius as shown in figure 3.4.
In the case of keyhole mode, the information within the calculated radius is displayed
as it is without applying any filter. In the case of foveated mode, information within
only half of the originally calculated radius is revealed as it is. From there, a median
filter is applied with gradually increasing radius up to a distance equal to the initially
estimated radius.
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Fig. 3.4. Controlled Local Disclosure for video frame shown in figure
3.2. (a) Keyhole mode output with marking (b) Keyhole mode output (c)
Foveated mode output with marking (d) Foveated mode output.
3.3 Privacy Protection During Crowd Interaction
However, if we allow revealing the regions based only on the above criteria, the
crowd-worker may click at all the points on a face and reveal it entirely. Hence, once
a small region is opened for viewing, we constrain the allowed regions for next clicks.
The worker is not allowed a click for which twice the radius of the to-be-revealed
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Fig. 3.5. (a) Output of Fovea system in keyhole mode for 100 random
clicks without protection against crowd-collusion (b) Output of Fovea sys-
tem in keyhole mode for 100 random clicks (same clicks as in (a)) with
protection against crowd-collusion. Green circles are not a part of Fovea
system’s output. Original Frame obtained from videoclip “Double Indem-
nity - 02560.avi” in the Hollywood2 dataset [24]
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Fig. 3.6. (a) Output of Fovea system in keyhole mode for 1000 random
clicks without protection against crowd-collusion (b) Output of Fovea sys-
tem in keyhole mode for 1000 random clicks (same clicks as in (a)) with
protection against crowd-collusion. Original Frame obtained from video-
clip “Double Indemnity - 02560.avi” in the Hollywood2 dataset [24]
region overlaps with already revealed area. Also, if the revealed region is kept static
throughout the video, the subjects may move in and out of this window, completely
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revealing their identities. Hence, the revealed region in a particular video frame is
propagated to other video frames using optical flow detection technique by [34].
Also, multiple judgments about the contents may be recorded on a single video. To
restrict the second worker from clicking close to the regions exposed by the previous
worker, the information revealed by the first worker is made available to the next
worker for a particular video. By this, we ensure that the workers may not be able
to reconstruct the sensitive information, by trading with each other the individual
pieces of information that each one of them has. The consecutive workers may choose
to build their hypothesis about a video from already revealed information or may
choose to reveal further regions as well.
Furthermore, to ensure that the original video frame is not accessible to the crowd-
worker, all the image processing is carried out at the server. The video frames are
served through a web-application which ensures that nothing except for the safe-to-




We chose 60 video clips randomly from the Hollywood2 video dataset [24]. These
clips were restricted to three seconds. These clips were chosen such that there was
atleast one human face present in the video clip. An accompanying dataset of faces
was created for each video. This dataset of faces contained ten faces for each video.
Out of these ten faces one or two faces were of the people present in the video. The
rest of the faces were chosen to be of the people visually similar to the subjects
present in the video. All the faces present in this dataset of faces were obtained from
Wikimedia Commons [35].
For establishing the ground truth, each of the three second video clip was anno-
tated manually for the location of the faces present in the corresponding faces dataset
along with the face reference number. The videos were also annotated for the action
present in the video. These video consist one or none of the action out of: ‘An-
swering a phone’, ‘Handshaking’, ‘Hugging’, ‘Kissing’, ‘Sitting down’, ‘Standing up’,
‘Climbing up or down the stairs’, ‘Getting out of/ getting in a car’, or ‘violence/
weapon’.
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For this evaluation of this thesis, We developed an interface that was presented to
the crowd-workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Figure 4.2 shows one such assign-
ment from the HITS created for the experiment. Each assignment in a HIT included
tagging and answering questions for three videos with the three different levels of
revelation—filter only, keyhole mode, foveated mode.
The experiment was started with 20 HITS, each consisting of one assignment,
which had three different movie clips blurred using a median filter of radius 23.
The first clip allowed no revelation—filter only mode; second clip allowed revealing a
small region using discrete boundaries—keyhole mode—whereas the third clip allowed
revealing regions with gradually decreasing blur—foveated mode. Once a particular
assignment was completed by a crowd-worker, another assignment was added to that
HIT with a maximum number of assignments limited to three per HIT. This was
done to ensure that no worker gets to see the same video twice even if a particular
assignment was returned several times by different workers. The new assignment
added, had the same sequence of videos, however, a new arrangement of the methods,
so that all the combinations of videos and methods could be completed. A latin square
algorithm was used for assigning jobs (video+method) to a particular assignment.
For each presented video, the crowd-workers were asked to watch the blurred video
clip. They had to tag faces then and match them to the person who they thought
were present in the tagged location. The interface for this is shown in figure 4.2.
As can be seen from the interface, the crowd workers were asked two questions -
1) What is happening in the video? and 2) Who is it that you are are tagging?
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Fig. 4.2. User Interface for tagging and analyzing videos through Crowd-
Sourcing on AMT
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What is happening in the video?
This question was put forward to analyze how well could the crowd workers un-
derstand the content of the video. They were provided with eleven choices including
“The video is not clear. I cannot make out the action present in the video.” The
default option selected was set to “No Response” (not shown on the interface) to
filter out the effect of accepted and submitted, however, unattempted assignments.
The first nine choices were selected such that any given video would have only one
of these options or none; hence, the tenth option of “ None of the above actions are
present in this video.”
Who is it that you are tagging?
This question was intended for evaluating the extent to which the system gives
away information about the identities of the people in the videos. Each video in
the dataset contains a random number of subjects. Some of the clips are of a single
individual carrying out a task while some have large crowds of people. Each video
clip was accompanied by a set of ten faces which had either one or two of the faces
present in the video. The rest of the faces in the options provided were chosen to be
visually similar to the actual face present. The crowd-workers were not informed of
the number of faces from the given options that were present in the video, to decrease
the possibility of success by chance.
4.2.2 Crowd Interaction
The crowd-workers were asked to pause the video and select a region on the frame
where they thought there was a face from the given options. This “tagging” of the face
which included the chosen face out of the given options, as well as the coordinates of
this face on the frame, was compared to the ground truth annotations for the dataset.
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If the face matched the actual face and the locations were within the annotated face
regions, the tagging was considered as a success; or failure otherwise.
Fig. 4.3. (a) Only filter mode; Disclosure of a region surrounding clicks by
(b) keyhole mode and (c) foveated mode; Original Frame obtained from
videoclip “Double Indemnity - 02560.avi” in the Hollywood2 dataset [24]
Apart from tagging the regions for a face, the interface also allowed the crowd-
workers to pause and click anywhere on the video to reveal a region. Each assignment,
as explained earlier, had three videos, one of them allowed revealing a circular window
of information using keyhole mode, the other one using foveated mode, while the third
one did not allow revealing on clicks at all.
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Figure 4.3 shows a frame in an assignment with regions revealed using Keyhole
and Fovea technique. It can be seen how these two approaches provide different levels
of exposure to the underlying information present in the actual frame, as well as the
added ability it provides to a worker for forming a hypothesis about the contents of
the video.
4.2.3 Instructions to Crowd-workers
Figure 4.4 shows the instructions provided to the crowd workers for carrying out
the task of tagging and analyzing the videos. After several runs and feedback from the
crowd-workers about the interface and their experience & understanding of the task,
the instructions were improved such that it directed them to do precisely what was
desired. With the following instructions, all the submitted tasks were of acceptable
quality and none of the submissions were rejected or filtered out.
Fig. 4.4. Instructions provided to workers for the task
4.2.4 Time, Cost and Incentives
Each video clip presented was of 3 seconds. On an average, it took about a
minute and a half for a crowd-worker to look at a video clip, tag the faces and answer
the question about the contents of the video. So for three videos per assignment,
31
which should take about 5 minutes to complete, workers were paid $0.75, which
amounts to $9/hour. Apart from this, the workers were provided with an incentive
of gaining a bonus of $0.10/correct tag if they correctly tagged a face. However, if
they tagged a face incorrectly, a $0.10/incorrect tag was deducted from their bonus.
These incentives were provided, to motivate an aggressive approach to breaking the
system for revealing identities.
This experimental setup was designed to compare the judgments made by workers
for each of the three cases—Only filter, keyhole mode and foveated mode—and eval-
uate how good or poor does a constrained revelation performs as compared to just
blurring of the video. This setup provided the basis to assess the algorithms against
the hypothesis that they could indeed provide an efficient solution to the problem of
conveying non-sensitive information to and concealing sensitive information from the
workers for any given video.
4.3 Results and Analysis
As described in earlier sections, the expected system should be able to reveal the
actions of the subjects in the video; however, the exposed region should not show
enough information to enable recognition of identities. To evaluate and validate the
system we presented the above-described implementation to the crowd-workers on
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Table 4.1 & 4.2 show the results in a concise form. Actual data obtained during
the experiment is presented in Appendix C. Each video had either one or two faces,
with total 84 faces in all the 60 videos. As can be seen from Table 4.1, the number
of faces correctly identified remains almost constant for all the three modes, whereas
the number of correctly identified actions increases after introducing the disclosure
modes.
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Table 4.1.: Total Correctly Identified Faces and Actions









Table 4.2 shows the total number of clicks—requests of disclosure—performed by
crowd-workers for each of the 60 videos.
Table 4.2.: Number of clicks by crowd-workers for each
video presented













1 1 Yes 0 No
2 1 Yes 0 No
3 4 Yes 3 Yes
4 1 Yes 0 No
5 1 Yes 6 Yes
6 1 Yes 0 No
7 1 Yes 0 No
8 2 Yes 4 No
9 4 Yes 4 No
continued on next page
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Table 4.2.: continued













10 1 Yes 1 Yes
11 1 Yes 1 Yes
12 1 Yes 1 Yes
13 2 Yes 1 Yes
14 2 Yes 15 Yes
15 2 Yes 1 Yes
16 1 No 2 Yes
17 2 Yes 2 Yes
18 2 Yes 2 Yes
19 2 Yes 2 Yes
20 1 Yes 2 Yes
21 1 Yes 1 Yes
22 1 Yes 0 No
23 0 No 2 Yes
24 4 Yes 1 Yes
25 1 Yes 1 Yes
26 1 Yes 5 Yes
27 5 Yes 2 Yes
28 3 Yes 1 Yes
29 1 Yes 1 No
30 3 Yes 1 Yes
31 1 Yes 1 Yes
continued on next page
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Table 4.2.: continued













32 10 Yes 1 Yes
33 1 Yes 1 Yes
34 0 Yes 5 Yes
35 3 Yes 4 Yes
36 1 Yes 1 Yes
37 1 No 0 Yes
38 1 Yes 2 Yes
39 1 No 1 Yes
40 3 Yes 1 Yes
41 1 Yes 2 Yes
42 0 Yes 1 Yes
43 4 Yes 3 Yes
44 7 Yes 0 No
45 0 No 1 Yes
46 3 No 3 No
47 10 Yes 2 Yes
48 1 Yes 1 Yes
49 0 Yes 13 Yes
50 1 Yes 2 Yes
51 1 Yes 1 No
52 3 Yes 1 Yes
53 31 Yes 1 Yes
continued on next page
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Table 4.2.: continued













54 2 Yes 4 Yes
55 9 Yes 13 Yes
56 3 Yes 0 Yes
57 2 Yes 2 Yes
58 0 Yes 2 Yes
59 5 No 1 Yes
60 1 Yes 12 Yes
Appendix C shows the entire data collected during the experiment. Here, the
outcomes for correctly identified faces and action by the crowd workers for a given
video and method is either True or False, that is the outcomes are categorical. Hence,
we carry out curve fitting for the collected data using logistic regression model.
The dataset used in this experiment includes video clips from Hollywood movies.
These video clips have different recording angles, illumination, and color saturation.
Hence, we include the effect of the videos for prediction as these videos have different
levels of difficulties with respect to recognizing actions or faces. Though it was ensured
that the same worker never sees a given video twice even with different methods, a
particular worker could work on any number of videos from the available set. These
workers could have different levels of abilities to carry out this task of recognizing
faces and actions. Some workers may be remarkably good in recognizing faces even
in a heavily blurred video while some may find it difficult even when some part of the
faces was exposed. So, we include the effect of workers as well for the curve fitting.
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Fig. 4.5. Odds ratios obtained using logistic regression model of the effects
of methods—Only filter, Keyhole mode and Foveated mode—on correct
actions identified and correct faces identified. Model has been adjusted
for the effects of different videos and workers. **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Performing the logistic regression for the above model, the fitting parameters
obtained are tabulated in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.
Table 4.3.











To compare the effect of the methods on the success rate of recognizing a correct
action/ correct tag, we calculated the Odd’s Ratio using the fitting parameters ob-
tained above. Figure 4.1 compares the Odds Ratios for these methods. As can be
observed, the keyhole and foveated modes perform significantly better than using the
only blur approach for revealing the necessary information required to form a hypoth-
esis about the contents of the videos. Moreover, it is observed that Fovea performs
much better than Keyhole for conveying this information.
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Table 4.5.
ANOVA Chi-squared test results for method as predictor and correct face
tags as outcome
Df Deviance Df Dev Pr(<Chi)
Resid. Resid.
NULL 250 273.75
factor 2 0.057256 248 273.69 0.9718
(method)
If we look at the results obtained for the success rate of a crowd-worker recognizing
a subject present in the video, the Odds Ratios for all the three methods are less
than 1. Keyhole and Fovea have higher Odds Ratios, indicating that they allow
more information than the only blur case, as is expected. However, performing a
chi-square in R for these three methods for the outcome - correct tags (Table 4.5),
gives a p− value = 0.9718, indicating that the performance of all the three methods




In this work we have addressed the following two questions:
1. Is it possible to reveal the nature of behavior and/or presence of an object,
without disclosing the identities of any depicted faces?
2. When revealing a small region, is an abrupt transition (keyhole mode) or a
gradual transition (foveated mode) from clear to blurred, more useful for helping
workers test their hypotheses?
As part of this work, we developed a complete system for answering the above
questions as well as to provide a feasible solution for the privacy-preserving crowd-
sourced video annotation task. The experiments revealed the following:
1. The implemented system allows revealing the nature of behavior and/or pres-
ence of an object, disclosing the identities of any depicted persons not signif-
icantly more than what is already disclosed by the initial blur. The p-value
of 0.9718 obtained from a chi-squared test (refer Table 4.5) shows very little
influence of allowing controlled disclosure over identity recognition by workers.
2. The evaluation results show that the workers were able to recognize the actions
significantly better using the local disclosure tool. As seen from the Odds ratio
(Figure 4.1), probability of a worker recognizing an activity correctly increases
more than twice for both the modes. This shows that the human workers
are able to test their hypotheses about what behaviors and/or objects may be
present using local disclosures.
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3. Also, the Odds ratio (Figure 4.1) shows that the foveated mode significantly
increases the chances of a worker recognizing an activity correctly, over the
keyhole mode. The probability increases by almost four times (≈ 3.8), when
using foveated mode.
Apart from the evaluation results enlisted above, the implemented system exhibits
following capabilities:
1. Interactive video-editing using server-side image processing
2. Protection against crowd collusion
3. Creation of database of video annotations
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Obfuscation
As was observed, the chance of face recognition depends significantly on the level
of initial blur. For evaluation of this thesis, we used median filter with empirically
decided radius. However,other possible methods of obfuscation as well as different
levels of blur in combination to the developed local disclosure tool needs to be studied,
to evaluate their effect on the face/action recognition ability of a crowd-worker.
5.2.2 Forming Hypotheses
Extending the above discussion about initial obfuscation, our system assumes that
the initial blur allows enough information to guide the crowd-worker to the region
of interest for clicking and revealing the content necessary for forming hypotheses.
The queries used for evaluation of this thesis included recognition of only prominent
actions in the video-clips. Effects of other techniques such as adaptive blur needs to
be studied for allowing a better initial estimation of video content.
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5.2.3 Local Disclosure
For our system, we disclosed the original image in the calculated safe-to-reveal
neighborhood of the click. Instead of showing the original image itself, a modified im-
age may be disclosed such that it increases the chance of accurate activity recognition
while decreasing the chance of identity disclosure.
5.2.4 Dataset
For the evaluation, the experimental set-up consisted of few, probably known,
faces of actors and actresses, present in the video clip. This attempted in modeling
the real world situation where a crowd-worker with his/her limited dataset of known
faces, gets to see a blurred video for analysis that happens to have a subject from
his/her dataset of known faces. A study with surveillance videos or body-camera
footage needs to be carried out.
5.3 Conclusion
Through our work, we have presented a crowd-powered system for unconstrained
video annotation that ensures the privacy of the subjects found in the video. We
have designed and evaluated a novel technique of providing a subset of a given visual
information, with two different variations, such that no facial identities are revealed.
Through our evaluations, we conclude that our system provides more details through
revealing restricted regions, which enables the crowd-workers to annotate the con-
tents of the video with increased accuracy. At the same time, the system limits the
revelation of facial identities, so that the workers do not have any more information
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Fig. A.1. Complete user-interface used for the experiment
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B. DATASET
The 60 video clips used in this experiment which were obtained from the Hollywood2—
Human Actions—dataset, created by Ivan Laptev [24] are shown below. Name of the
























1 Only Blur 1 - 1 2 No
1 Keyhole 4 0 1 2 No
1 Foveated 2 1 1 2 Yes
2 Only Blur 2 - 1 2 Yes
2 Keyhole 1 0 0 2 No
2 Foveated 4 1 1 2 Yes
3 Only Blur 4 - 0 1 Yes
3 Keyhole 2 1 1 1 Yes
3 Foveated 1 4 1 1 Yes
4 Only Blur 8 - 0 2 Yes
4 Keyhole 17 0 0 2 No
4 Foveated 2 1 1 2 Yes
5 Only Blur 2 - 1 2 Yes
5 Keyhole 8 1 1 2 Yes
5 Foveated 17 1 0 2 Yes
6 Only Blur 17 - 0 1 No
6 Keyhole 2 0 0 1 No
continued on next page
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6 Foveated 8 1 0 1 Yes
7 Only Blur 6 - 0 1 Yes
7 Keyhole 16 0 0 1 No
7 Foveated 4 1 0 1 Yes
8 Only Blur 4 - 0 2 No
8 Keyhole 6 0 1 2 No
8 Foveated 16 2 0 2 Yes
9 Only Blur 16 - 0 1 Yes
9 Keyhole 4 0 1 1 No
9 Foveated 6 4 0 1 Yes
10 Only Blur 2 - 0 2 Yes
10 Keyhole 4 1 1 2 Yes
10 Foveated 9 1 0 2 Yes
11 Only Blur 9 - 0 2 Yes
11 Keyhole 2 1 0 2 Yes
11 Foveated 4 1 0 2 Yes
12 Only Blur 4 - 1 1 Yes
12 Keyhole 9 1 0 1 Yes
12 Foveated 2 1 0 1 Yes
13 Only Blur 7 - 0 1 Yes
13 Keyhole 13 1 1 1 Yes
13 Foveated 10 2 0 1 Yes
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14 Only Blur 10 - 1 1 No
14 Keyhole 7 1 0 1 Yes
14 Foveated 13 2 1 1 Yes
15 Only Blur 13 - 0 1 No
15 Keyhole 10 1 0 1 Yes
15 Foveated 7 2 1 1 Yes
16 Only Blur 34 - 1 1 No
16 Keyhole 61 1 0 1 Yes
16 Foveated 55 1 0 1 Yes
17 Only Blur 55 - 0 1 No
17 Keyhole 34 1 0 1 Yes
17 Foveated 61 2 1 1 Yes
18 Only Blur 61 - 0 1 No
18 Keyhole 55 1 0 1 Yes
18 Foveated 34 2 0 1 Yes
19 Only Blur 35 - 0 1 Yes
19 Keyhole 64 1 0 1 Yes
19 Foveated 55 2 0 1 Yes
20 Only Blur 55 - 0 2 No
20 Keyhole 35 1 0 2 Yes
20 Foveated 64 1 0 2 Yes
21 Only Blur 64 - 0 1 No
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21 Keyhole 55 1 0 1 Yes
21 Foveated 35 1 0 1 Yes
22 Only Blur 4 - 1 2 No
22 Keyhole 1 0 0 2 No
22 Foveated 53 1 0 2 Yes
23 Only Blur 53 - 0 1 Yes
23 Keyhole 4 1 0 1 Yes
23 Foveated 1 0 1 1 No
24 Only Blur 1 - 1 2 No
24 Keyhole 53 1 0 2 Yes
24 Foveated 4 4 1 2 Yes
25 Only Blur 38 - 1 1 No
25 Keyhole 47 1 0 1 Yes
25 Foveated 4 1 0 1 Yes
26 Only Blur 4 - 0 1 No
26 Keyhole 38 1 1 1 Yes
26 Foveated 47 1 0 1 Yes
27 Only Blur 47 - 1 2 No
27 Keyhole 4 1 1 2 Yes
27 Foveated 38 5 1 2 Yes
28 Only Blur 26 - 0 1 Yes
28 Keyhole 60 1 0 1 Yes
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28 Foveated 55 3 0 1 Yes
29 Only Blur 55 - 0 1 No
29 Keyhole 26 0 0 1 No
29 Foveated 60 1 0 1 Yes
30 Only Blur 60 - 0 1 Yes
30 Keyhole 55 1 0 1 Yes
30 Foveated 26 3 0 1 Yes
31 Only Blur 4 - 1 1 No
31 Keyhole 42 1 0 1 Yes
31 Foveated 38 1 0 1 Yes
32 Only Blur 38 - 0 2 No
32 Keyhole 4 1 0 2 Yes
32 Foveated 42 10 0 2 Yes
33 Only Blur 42 - 0 1 Yes
33 Keyhole 38 1 0 1 Yes
33 Foveated 4 1 0 1 Yes
34 Only Blur 4 - 0 1 No
34 Keyhole 59 1 0 1 Yes
34 Foveated 55 0 0 1 Yes
35 Only Blur 55 - 0 2 Yes
35 Keyhole 4 1 2 2 Yes
35 Foveated 59 3 0 2 Yes
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36 Only Blur 59 - 0 1 No
36 Keyhole 55 1 0 1 Yes
36 Foveated 4 1 1 1 Yes
37 Only Blur 29 - 0 2 No
37 Keyhole 57 1 0 2 Yes
37 Foveated 44 1 0 2 No
38 Only Blur 44 - 1 1 Yes
38 Keyhole 29 1 0 1 Yes
38 Foveated 57 1 0 1 Yes
39 Only Blur 57 - 0 1 No
39 Keyhole 44 1 0 1 Yes
39 Foveated 29 1 0 1 No
40 Only Blur 23 - 0 1 No
40 Keyhole 55 1 0 1 Yes
40 Foveated 1 3 0 1 Yes
41 Only Blur 1 - 1 1 No
41 Keyhole 23 1 0 1 Yes
41 Foveated 55 1 0 1 Yes
42 Only Blur 55 - 1 2 Yes
42 Keyhole 1 1 1 2 Yes
42 Foveated 23 0 1 2 Yes
43 Only Blur 28 - 0 2 Yes
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43 Keyhole 62 1 0 2 Yes
43 Foveated 51 4 0 2 Yes
44 Only Blur 51 - 0 1 No
44 Keyhole 28 0 0 1 No
44 Foveated 62 7 0 1 Yes
45 Only Blur 62 - 0 2 No
45 Keyhole 51 1 1 2 Yes
45 Foveated 28 0 0 2 No
46 Only Blur 39 - 1 2 Yes
46 Keyhole 52 0 0 2 No
46 Foveated 38 3 1 2 No
47 Only Blur 38 - 1 2 No
47 Keyhole 39 1 1 2 Yes
47 Foveated 52 10 0 2 Yes
48 Only Blur 52 - 0 1 No
48 Keyhole 38 1 0 1 Yes
48 Foveated 39 1 0 1 Yes
49 Only Blur 33 - 0 1 Yes
49 Keyhole 55 1 0 1 Yes
49 Foveated 46 0 0 1 Yes
50 Only Blur 46 - 0 2 Yes
50 Keyhole 33 1 0 2 Yes
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50 Foveated 55 1 0 2 Yes
51 Only Blur 55 - 0 2 No
51 Keyhole 46 0 0 2 No
51 Foveated 33 1 1 2 Yes
52 Only Blur 27 - 1 2 No
52 Keyhole 41 1 1 2 Yes
52 Foveated 38 3 2 2 Yes
53 Only Blur 38 - 0 1 No
53 Keyhole 27 0 0 1 No
53 Foveated 41 31 0 1 Yes
54 Only Blur 41 - 1 2 Yes
54 Keyhole 38 1 2 2 Yes
54 Foveated 27 2 1 2 Yes
55 Only Blur 4 - 0 1 Yes
55 Keyhole 40 1 0 1 Yes
55 Foveated 38 9 0 1 Yes
56 Only Blur 38 - 0 1 Yes
56 Keyhole 4 1 1 1 Yes
56 Foveated 40 3 1 1 Yes
57 Only Blur 40 - 0 2 Yes
57 Keyhole 38 1 1 2 Yes
57 Foveated 4 2 2 2 Yes
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58 Only Blur 66 - 1 1 Yes
58 Keyhole 68 1 0 1 Yes
58 Foveated 67 0 0 1 Yes
59 Only Blur 67 - 0 1 Yes
59 Keyhole 66 1 0 1 Yes
59 Foveated 68 5 0 1 No
60 Only Blur 68 - 1 1 Yes
60 Keyhole 67 1 0 1 Yes
60 Foveated 66 1 0 1 Yes
